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This paper aims at assessing the relationship between ownership structure, performance and investment 
activity. In particular it studies how behavioural differences between farms related to ownership structure 
influence  farms'  investment  activity  and  thus  their  further  development  potential  resulting  in  farm 
structural  changes.  The  paper  analyses  a  sample  of  corporate  farms  over  7  years,  1997-2003,  using 
structural model of three equations including investment accelerator model. This model considers the 
effect of ownership on (a) technical efficiency as proxy for the quality of operational management, (b) 
returns  on  capital  as  proxy  for  quality  of  financial  management,  (c)  investment  activity,  and  (d) 
investment sensitivity to internal funds as proxy for owners/managers opposition to credit financing. The 
empirical results provide evidence of a theoretically justifiable positive effect of ownership concentration 
on  investment  activity  and  farms’  economic  performance,  and  a  theoretically  consistent  effect  of 
external/employee ownership on technical performance. However, the authors are not able to confirm 
empirically the theoretically based effect of external/employee ownership on farm investment activity. 
Key words: corporate ownership, employee ownership, external ownership, agency problem, investment 
behaviour, financial constraint 
1  INTRODUCTION 
Investment  activity  which  secures  sufficient  technological  progress  or  facilitates  other  competitive 
strategies is one of the most important preconditions for a firm economic viability. Investment activity 
could play a particularly vital role for efficient structural adjustment in the agricultural sectors in the New 
EU Member States (NMS) of the European Union (EU), which had been considered as undercapitalised 
during transition period (JANDA, SLENKOVA, VIGNER 1997) and which are facing high competition after 
EU accession, (BLANCHARD AND KREMER 1997, LIZAL AND SVEJNAR 2000).  
As  financial  literature  suggests,  among  the  most  important  preconditions  for  efficient  investment 
development is well functioning capital and credit institutions and markets with close to zero information 
asymmetries between the bank and the client and abolished effect of soft-budget constraints. Because of 
the  little  attention  paid  to  soft-budget  constraints  in  existing  empirical  analyses,  and  the  fact  that 
agriculture  is  limited  in  the  use  of  capital  market  instruments,  the  credit  market  and  information 
distribution can be assumed to have played the most important role as external factors in investment 
development. Czech farms were found to be credit constrained in a number of studies. BEZEMER (2002, 
2003) identified that in the early years of transition newly established individual private farms were more 
credit constrained than successor farms of former collective and state farms. The main reasons for this 
observation were the information advantages and established networks of the large-scale farms. For the 
later years of transition, LATRUFFE, DAVIDOVA  AND RATINGER (2005) and LATRUFFE  AND DAVIDOVA 
(2007) derive from indebtedness/efficiency relationship analysis that credits, even if still constraining in 
their amount, are allocated predominantly on the basis of standardised criteria for economic valuation of 
the agricultural clients. MEDONOS (2007) supports their argument and provides an empirical evidence 
using  an  investment  accelerator  model  for  the  years  1997  to  2003.  These  evidences  indicate  that 
economic efficiency has not only been determining current competitiveness of Czech farms but that, 
through  its  effect  on  investment  potential,  has  been  intensifying  the  difference  in  the  farms  future 
viability.   
                                                 
1 The authors would like to thank for the data provided by the Research Institute of Agricultural Economics (VÚZE) in Prague, 
which collection was jointly financed by the Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern Europe (IAMO), 
Halle (Saale), Germany, and a grant from the Czech National  Agency  for  Agricultural Research. The authors are solely 
responsible for the information provided in the paper; it neither represents the opinion of the European Commission nor the 
Institutions supporting this research. 
 Important factor which can be assumed to have slowed down investment activity during transition in 
Czech agriculture has been high uncertainty
2 steaming from output price volatility, political instability, 
for  a  long  time  unknown  design  of  Common  Agricultural  Policy  (CAP)  after  EU  accession  and  the 
overall effect of EU single market. Beside that, long-lasting ownership rights reforms, differences in 
involved actors’ interests and discrepancies between legal framework and feasibility of the privatisation 
process likely represented further investment constraints. As property right and agency theories suggest, 
not only the unsettled ownership relationship, but firm ownership and governance structure alone have a 
close relationship to firm performance as well as investment activity and optimality. Despite the fact that 
around 70 % of Czech agricultural land and even higher share of agricultural assets fall under corporate 
farm  governance,  the  possible  effect  of  corporate  ownership  on  investment  activity  has  not  been 
previously considered
3. 
This  paper  aims  at  covering  this  research  gap.  The  main  research  question  followed  is: What  is  the 
relationship between ownership structure, performance and investment activity? How will behavioural 
differences between farms related to ownership structure influence farms' investment activity and thus 
their further development potential and structural changes? The paper analyses 74 corporate farms over 7 
years  time  period,  1997-2003,  using  a  structural  model  of  three  equations  including  an  investment 
accelerator model. This model considers the effect of ownership on (a) technical efficiency as proxy for 
the  quality  of  operational  management,  (b)  returns  on  capital  as  proxy  for  quality  of  financial 
management,  (c)  investment  activity,  and  (d)  investment  sensitivity  to  internal  funds  as  proxy  for 
owners/managers opposition to credit financing. 
The  following  section  describes  the  main  development  in  the  Czech  farm  ownership  structure  and 
conditions for corporate governance. Section three provides a discourse into the theoretical literature 
dealing  with  the  relationship  between  ownership,  performance  and  investment  behaviour.  The 
methodology,  data  and  model  specification  are  described  in  section  four.  Section  five  presents  the 
empirical results and their interpretation. Section six concludes the paper.  
2  OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND INVESTMENT ACTIVITY OF CZECH CORPORATE FARMS 
The Czech farm structure has developed into a dual farm structure with a large number of small-scale 
individual private farms (ca 43.5 thousand in 2005) cultivating approximately 30 % of total agricultural 
land, and a relatively small number of large-scale corporate farms (ca 2.9 thousand in 2005) cultivating 
the remaining agricultural land. With the significant dominance of corporate farming on total agricultural 
production, this farm structure in Czech agriculture has not only captured the privatisation policies and 
institutional framework established during the transition period, but also the historical large-scale farm 
tradition developed during the socialist time. Also historically imbedded characteristics, interests and 
unbalanced  bargaining  powers  of  actors  assuming  restituted  property  rights  or  being  involved  in  the 
privatisation process have shaped the development of farm ownership structure during transition.  
The privatisation objective was to individualize property rights and correct former injustices (RATINGER 
AND RABINOWICZ 1997). The significant position of corporate farming after the implementation of policy 
reforms was thus an unexpected development. The Czech corporate farms, which the study focuses on, 
are successors of former collective or state farms. Before transition, state farms cultivated 37 % and 
collective  farms  62  %  of  Czech  agricultural  land  (1  %  was  cultivated  by  individual  farmers).  The 
privatisation process differed between former state and collective farms. After settling original owners' 
restitution  titles,  state  farms  were  privatised  mainly  by  means  of  direct  sales  to  acquirers  who  were 
selected based on a proposed privatisation project (49 % of privatised state farms), of gratuitous transfers 
                                                 
2   The  initial  neoclassical  view  on  investment/uncertainty  relationship  was  such  that  increased  uncertainty  would  boost 
investment (ABEL 1983). However, in a context of various market imperfections, such as investment irreversibility which 
increases  adjustment  costs  asymmetries,  uncertainty  shows  investment  (ABEL  AND  EBERLY  1994,  BARNETT  AND 
SAKELLARIS 1998; CHIRINKO AND SCHALLER 2002). Also market power and returns to scale affect the level of investment 
under uncertainty (SAKELLARIS 1994). Finally, the Real Options Theory views the investment decision as embodying two 
options; uncertainty directly affects the value of these two options due to the interaction of irreversibility of capital and the 
‘arrival’ of new information (DIXIT AND PINDYCK 1994;  CABALLERO AND PINDYCK 1996). 
3   The theoretically often discussed effect of ownership structure on firm investment behaviour has been captured only in very 
few  empirical  studies  in  general  (CHO  1998).  Few  papers  consider  this  partially  by  looking  at  the  role  of  potential 
ownership-related  agency  problems  in  investment  financing  decision  (see  FAZZARI  ET  AL.  1988,  MUELLER  AND PEEV 
2007). (29 % of cases), and of competitive biddings (11 % of cases) (Report on the State of Agriculture in the 
Czech Republic for the year 2005 - "Green Report"). The remaining cases represented public auctions and 
direct establishment of a Joint Stock Company (JSC). Around 10 % from the original 316 state farms 
went bankruptcy or are still being liquidated. The established farms are mostly corporate farms of a 
Limited Liability Company (LLC) legal form.  
The  collective  farms  were  privatised  through  restitutions  of  the  original  value  of  expropriated  and 
collectivised assets to original owners (or their heirs) and distribution of accumulated collective assets 
during the socialist period to eligible persons (original owners and former workers). As a result, the 
reforms created a very fragmented ownership structure with almost 3.5 million eligible persons to (non-
land) agricultural assets. The eligible persons had the right to decide on (a) withdrawal (financial or 
physical settlement) of their transformation claims, if they farmed or participated in a farming company 
or (b) on depositing their shares in the equity of a new corporate form (c) on waiting on the later rather 
financial settlement of their claims, leaving their shares with transforming collective farms for a time 
being
4. High share of the eligible persons decided for the alternative of leaving their full or part of their 
titles  as  shares  with  the  successor  companies  (b-c)
5.  The  "newly"  established  corporate  forms  were 
predominantly cooperatives, but JSCs and LLCs appeared as well. As the eligible persons, who decided 
to retain their shares (or their parts) in the corporate farm, were not only original owners but also former 
workers of the collective farms, the transformed collective farms inherited a high share of employed 
shareholders  and  pensioners-shareholders.  In  1994  the  share  of  employed  shareholders  in  the  total 
agricultural assets retained by the corporate farms after restitutions was 38 %. External owners owned 
27 % of the assets. The remaining value (35 %) was asset of eligible persons of the category (c) which we 
term residual owners (DIVILA 1996)
6. Since corporate farms had not generated enough profits, monetary 
compensation had happened only rarely and residual owners, little protected by the existing legal system, 
remained waiting.   
The residual owners to agricultural assets represented two problems to corporate farms. The first one was 
a legal issue and the second one an economic issue. As stated by the Transformation law, the property 
rights restitutions were to be concluded within 7 years from the presentment of the transformation project 
by each collective farm. This process pursued slowly and has often exceeded this deadline. The economic 
problem inhered in transformation indebtedness which often represented a constraint to credit access. 
Finding the solution for the settlement of the residual owners' ownership titles became a subject of strong 
bargaining – the residual owners on the one side and corporate farms' managers on the other. The most 
often pursued way of formalizing the relationship to residual owners was concluding contract of lease to 
assets of adequate value (mostly done by already existing LLCs) or to capitalise the residual ownership 
shares into shares and thus transforming the company into a JSC if not done yet. Between 1995 and 2003, 
corporate farms' transformation indebtedness dropped from 55 billion to 29 billion
7. At the same time, the 
representation of legal forms of corporate farms significantly changed. In 1995 most of the agricultural 
land was cultivated by cooperative (47 %), followed by LLCs (20 %) and JSCs (7 %). Until 2005 the 
representation of JSCs on agricultural land increased to 22 % and of cooperatives decreased to 26 %. The 
share of LLCs on agricultural land remained almost unchanged. This indicated that the JSCs represent 
predominantly  legally  transformed  cooperatives.  The  most  important  process  from  the  ownership 
perspective is the significant increase of the external owners' share from 38 % in 1995 to 66 % in 2001 
(the Czech Statistical Office, CzSO 2001). Obviously, the increase 28 percentage points can be accounted 
mainly to residual persons who were at the end convinced that capitalising the transformation claims into 
stocks thus facilitating their possible tradability was the only way how to retain and later obtain their 
                                                 
4   The successors of collective farms were allowed to delay the financial settlement of claims of non-farmers until the end of 
1999. 
5   Contributing  factors  to  this  decision  were  lacking  specific  knowledge  of  the  eligible  persons  required  for  starting  an 
individual farm or their already established job security. 
6   The average value of the assets assigned to residual eligible persons is, on average, small. Two-fifths of the residual owners 
own assets below 10,000 Czech Crowns (330 Euros), with the “richer” fifth owning over 100,000 Czech Crowns (3,300 
Euros) (Divila 2003). 
7   The transformation indebtedness level in 1995 was the highest in LLCs (56 %), second highest in cooperatives (37 %) and 
lowest in JSCs (13 %). From 1995 to 2005, the transformation indebtedness shifted dramatically. LLCs remained indebted 
by transformation debts from 29 % and cooperatives by 29 %. JSCs displayed far lowest transformation indebtedness equal 
to on average 3.6 %.  value paid off. The remaining 34 % is the share of internal (employed) owners, which makes the Czech 
corporate farms hybrid ownership form between labour-managed and investor-managed firm.  
Restructuring  of  ownership  balance  in  favour  to  external  owners  can  have  an  effect  on  investment 
decisions of corporate farms. The agricultural corporate farms are significantly smaller than corporate 
firms in other industries, however, are still assigned by highly dispersed ownership with smaller share 
sizes. In general, capital market for agriculture is different to other sectors, because corporate farms can 
use  only  a  limited  spectrum  of  financial  instruments.  Because  of  the  specific  nature  of  the  JSCs  in 
agriculture, open capital market for their shares does not exist which constrains possibility of meeting 
between  potential  buyers  and  sellers.  Thus  most  of  the  shares  are  either  bought  out  by  the  farming 
companies  or  and  first  of  all  by  individual  or  groups  of  other  current  owners  who  are  interest  in 
accumulating power. These processes can be well controlled by managers. The low experience of new 
owners  with  corporate  governance  possibly  leads  to  low  effectiveness  of  internal  budgeting  and 
monitoring systems against managerial discretion. Also, high level of trust to managers, high reliance on 
the experience and knowledge of former managers, higher average age and lower education level of 
agricultural  workers  representing  one  group  of  owners,  possibly  increase  the  scope  for  managerial 
discretion. In addition, the civil law legal system offers only a weak protection of shareholders' rights
8. 
All these aspects related to corporate governance of Czech corporate farms contribute to the relevance of 
studying corporate governance as a possible determinant of farm investment and performance.  
3  THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The relationship between corporate ownership structure, performance and investment activity (Figure 1, 
explained later) is closely akin to issue of corporate governance. Corporate governance is a system by 
which business corporations are directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the 
distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as the 
board,  managers  and  shareholders,  and  spells  out  the  rules  and  procedures  for  making  decisions  on 
corporate affairs. By doing this, it also provides the structure through which the company objectives are 
set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance (CADBURY 1992: 15, OECD 
2004). SCHLEIFER AND VISHNY (1997: 737) consider corporate governance as a way in which suppliers of 
finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. 
 
                                                 
8   For transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe in general, GUGLER  ET  AL. (2004) state that the less effective 
corporate governance institutions offer shareholders lesser protection against potential managers' pursuit of their own goals. 
For  the  description  of  effect  of  the  differences  in  the  capital  market  and  legal  system  for  shareholders'  protection  in 
transition and Western European Countries on investment behaviour see also MUELLER AND PEEV (2007). Stigliz (1999) 
also argues that the main reason for slower increase of firm-level efficiency in transition countries than what was expected 
from the developed economies experience is the fact that successful privatisation required an institutional infrastructure that 
supports markets and stresses the role of effective corporate governance.  
 
Figure 1 The conceptual framework of causal relations between corporate ownership and investment 
activity 
 
The main problem related to corporate governance is the problem steaming from separation of ownership 
and control of the firm operation and finance. This separation provides scope for managerial discretion if 
there is a conflict of interest between shareholders (principals) and managers (agents) because of differing 
ideas, interests and goals. The conflicting ideas can relate to how the company should be run, what type 
of strategy to follow or how to finance investments. Investment decisions are considered to be optimal 
when the return on total investment is equal to the cost of capital
9. In this situation, managers maximize 
shareholders wealth. However, as JENSEN AND MECKLING (1976:5) state:  
"It is generally impossible for the principal or the agent at zero cost to ensure that the agent will make optimal decisions from 
the principal's viewpoint. In most agency relationships the principal and the agent will incur positive monitoring and bonding 
costs, and in addition there will be some divergence between the agent's decisions and those decisions which would maximise 
the welfare of the principal."  
These relationships are the subject of agency theory and the costs related to these relationships are called 
agency costs. It investigates how incentive mechanisms
10 can help principals to get a return on their 
exchanges with the management. However, also transaction cost economics significantly contributes to 
framing the principal agent relationship.  It deals with the institutions that may help to minimize the 
transaction  costs  of  the  managerial  agency  problem.  The  decisions  making  in  a  firm  with  delegated 
control, including meeting decisions on investment, will be influenced by transaction conditions such as 
asymmetric information, complexity and uncertainty, measurability, or asset specificity. Transaction cost 
theory identifies them as the environmental conditions. Beside these, also behavioural conditions, e.g. 
opportunism, bounded rationality and risk aversion, are considered as factors influencing the costs of the 
principal agent relationship and thus the investment decision optimality with regard to maximisation of 
owners’ welfare. 
                                                 
9   The ratio of return on total investment to the cost of capital is the marginal return on capital. This measure should be equal 
to or greater than one, if managers maximise shareholder wealth. Infra-marginal returns on total investment will exceed one 
if there are diminishing returns to investment making the ratio of the returns on total investment to the cost of capital 
greater than one (MUELLER AND PEEV 2007).    
10   E.g., performance monitoring system, remuneration systems, bankruptcy systems, market for corporate control, market for 
management services, product market competition. Ownership structure is also considered as one form of the incentive 
mechanisms. 
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Ownership structure 
Investment activity  
(Iit/Kit) 
Return on capital/investment  
    (CFit-1/Kit-1)  
(Quality of financial management 
+ Quality of operational management) 
=> internal funds 
Technical performance 
(TEit-1) 
(Quality of operational 
management) 
Investment sensitivity  
to internal funds For the Czech corporate farms' case, more relevant description of the two parties in the principal agent 
relation is the BERGLÖF  AND PAJUSTE (2005) description of the major corporate governance problem. 
They view it as a conflict between the controlling shareholder and the minority shareholder. The conflict 
steams from the interest and objective differences between these two groups of shareholders. For the aim 
of this study, we define following ownership categories: the share of employed owners versus the share of 
firm external owners, managerial ownership
11, ownership concentration
12 and total number of owners in 
the farm. 
Share of employee ownership versus external ownership is expected to have an effect on investment 
decisions as there are differences in interests and concerns between these two categories of owners. The 
most important difference between the considerations of employed owners and external investors is that 
investment into capital-intensive technologies  (without expansion of the firm which is limited in the 
Czech agriculture due to limited land access) or failure of the firm would affect employed owners' job 
security. Therefore, employees as shareholders are perceived as more risk averse affecting their attitude to 
investment  projects.  DOW  (2003)  titled  this  as  "finance  pessimism".  Another  problem  of  employee-
managed firms closely allied with investment behaviour lies in what JENSEN AND MECKING (1979; see 
also FURUBOTN 1976) term "the horizon problem". This implies that when workers leave the firm after 
their work contract they lose their share of the value of any capital that has been accumulated by the firm 
and  thus  have  insufficient  incentives  in  projects  with  long  payback  periods
13.  As  a  result,  employed 
owners prefer current consumption to investment (JONES  ET  AL. 2005). This can relate the employee 
ownership to lower investment activity, possibly to under investment.  
Because firms with higher share of employee ownership tend to be conservative in investment which 
relates to less than optimal investment level, they are expected to achieve lower returns on investment. On 
the other hand, the returns on capital and investment can be influenced by the employee ownership effect 
on technical performance. As DOW (2003) argues, employee ownership aligns the incentives of insiders 
with companies' performance. This effect can be further considered as more important in more labour-
intensive production (JONES AND KATO 1993), however, it decreases with the size of the company as a 
result of the high cost of collective decision-making (HANSMANN 1996). Lastly, the higher risk aversion 
of employed owners could also lead to preferring internal funds to external financing due to higher risk of 
bank calling their firm bankrupt in the case of investment failure. This would imply higher investment 
sensitivity to generated cash flows than in firms with higher share of external owners. 
Hypothesis 1: Higher share of employed shareholders (compared to external shareholders) is related to 
lower  investment  activity,  lower  return  on  investment  due  to  less  efficient  financial  decision,  higher 
technical performance, and higher investment sensitivity to internal funds. 
Total  number  of  farm  shareholders  is  used  to  capture  the  decision-making  complexity.  Under  the 
condition of information asymmetries and bounded rationality, this complexity creates a larger scope for 
managerial discretion and hence a space to carry through, to a higher degree, managers’ interests. It thus 
creates conditions for managerial transaction costs. Transaction cost economics of corporate governance 
describes  managerial  transaction  costs  as  costs  of  free  cash  flow  dispersion,  replacement  resistance, 
resistance to profit liquidation or merger, power struggles, excessive risk taking, excessive diversification,  
excessive growth, etc. For example, GRABOWSKI AND MUELLER (1972) state that managers likely follow 
growth strategies investing in less profitable projects. Managers can succeed in promoting higher than 
optimal investment to owners because they can provide excessively optimistic projections of the project’s 
benefits and owners do not dispose of sufficient information and expertise to effectively control such 
projects. Possible reason for less optimal managers behaviour is that, compared to owners, their personal 
wealth is not at stake (JENSEN 1986; ANG 1991). Regarding the use of internal versus external sources for 
investment financing, the less optimal investment projects make managers to prefer internal funds to 
external capital market, because they wish to avoid external scrutiny (MUELLER AND PEEV 2007). 
                                                 
11   A situation in which managers own higher than average ownership shares in the firm.  
12   Average shareholders’ share on farm fixed capital (capital stock).
 
13   It is a specific of Czech agriculture that ownership status of employed shareholders does not terminate in the moment of 
work contract termination. They can remain external shareholders. However, the work contract of people who decide to 
become shareholders of the company they work in mostly continue working in this company till their retirement age. In this 
age, they prefer to receive the value and consume their shares than to continue receiving only dividends, which are only an 
insufficient contribution to the pension. As internal funds are important for investment activity, the ability of generating sufficient internal fund 
level is of further importance. The above discussed high managerial transaction costs of firms with higher 
number of shareholders imply overall higher agency costs which not only affect the investment decisions 
but also overall (financial and technical) performance of the firm. On the other hand, the high number of 
owners allows to reach such a size that brings benefits from economies of scale and the effect of agency 
costs on technical performance is likely abolished (HANSMANN 1996). 
Hypothesis  2:  Higher  shareholders  number  (higher  decision-making  complexity)  is  related  to  higher 
investment activity, lower return on investment due to less optimal investment projects, higher technical 
performance due to economies of scale, and higher investment sensitivity to internal funds. 
Ownership concentration defined a situation in which a group of investors decided to invest a higher 
value in the farm than the average share and hence characterises owners which have a higher interest and 
a higher trust in the performance of the business. As these investors invested higher capital in the farms, 
they can be assumed to be less risk averse than the small shareholders. The fact that they have more at 
stake stimulates them to a better managers monitoring. The higher ownership shares give shareholders 
higher  decision-making  power  which  reduces  the  costs  of  internal  control  and  allows  overwhelming 
interests of more risk-averse small shareholders. However, as ownership and control are still separated, 
this  ownership  characteristics  leads  to  higher  investment  activity  than  if  ownership  and  control  are 
concentrated in the same hands. Nevertheless, more efficient control of managers' performance reduces 
managers' transaction costs and leads to more optimal investment decision. Due to lower managerial 
transaction  costs  and  more  effective  control  of  the  farm  operation,  farms  with  more  concentrated 
ownership are expected to achieve higher technical performance than less capital concentrated farms. 
More optimal investment and higher technical performance means higher returns on capital and no fear 
from bank control of the investment projects. Because of the lower risk aversion, principal investment 
project optimality and higher performance, ownership concentration is expected to lead to a higher use of 
external financing for investment projects.   
Hypothesis 3: Higher ownership concentration is related to higher investment activity due to lower risk 
aversion, higher returns on investment due to more optimal investment decisions, higher TE due to lower 
agency costs and lower investment sensitivity to internal funds. 
Also a situation in which controlling managers own higher capital shares reduces agency costs (WRIGHT 
ET AL. 2001). The investment decision-making of managing shareholders is influenced by the fact that 
managers’  personal  wealth  is  more  at  stake  than  in  the  case  of  complete  separation  of  control  and 
ownership or of managers’ negligible ownership shares. The investment activity can be considered as 
more optimal, however, if the managerial ownership will lead to higher or lower investment activity, will 
depend  on  the  capitalisation  level  of  the  sector.  If  the  sector  is  overcapitalised,  higher  managerial 
ownership will lead to lower investment activity than more separated ownership and control and vice 
versa.  The  managerial  ownership  and  investment  relationship  will  also  be  affected  by  the  degree  of 
existing uncertainties (expected change of policy support, market price volatility or legal uncertainties). 
Under high uncertainties managers with higher ownership shares are more risk averse than managers with 
no or lower ownership shares, and are thus more cautious in their investment decisions and vice versa. 
Because of the above arguments, the managerial ownership reduces the tendencies to invest into less 
profitable investment projects (the invested amount is expected to be closer to the investment optimum) 
which  reflects  in  higher  returns  on  capital.  Only  high  uncertainties  could  disturb  this  reasoning. 
Independence of the external effect of uncertainty, managers owning higher shares provides incentives for 
more optimal technical management and operation of the business. Due to better performance indicators, 
managerial  ownership  would  lead  to  better  credit  access  and  without  uncertain  business  conditions 
increasing owners risk aversion, managers would have no particular motivation for preferring internal to 
credit  financing.  This  is  further  supported  by  the  weaker  control  retained  by  the  small  shareholders 
providing  space  for  financial  redistribution  of  generated  profits  benefiting  controlling  shareholder-
managers. Both arguments would lead to a lower sensitivity of investment to internal funds. 
Hypothesis  4:  Higher  managerial  ownership  is  related  to  more  optimal  investment  activity,  higher 
returns on investment, higher TE due to lower agency costs and lower investment sensitivity to internal 
funds. 4  METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
The four hypotheses discussed above are compiled in Table 1 following the framework of the causal 
relationship between ownership, performance and investment activity displayed in Figure 1. 
Table 1: Expected ownership effect on farm investment behaviour 
Effect on    Ownership characteristics 





sensitivity to CF/K 
H1  Employee ownership  -  -  +
1)  + 
H2  Shareholders’ number  +  -  +
1)  + 
H3  Ownership concentration  +  +  +  - 
H4  Managerial ownership  +
2)/-
 3) 4)  +/-
 4)  +  -/+
4) 
Note: ‘+’ indicates a positive and ‘–‘ a negative effect. 
1) Conditioned on farm size. 
2) Under under-capitalisation of the sector. 
3) Under overcapitalisation of the sector.  
4) Possible under high business uncertainties. 
 
The conceptual framework depicted in Figure 1 can be translated in the econometric model consisting of 
a system of three equations defined below. Equation (1) is based on an accelerator model in the context of 
credit market imperfections and agency problems. The original accelerator model specified by Clark, 
(1917) assumes that a firm’s investment was mainly determined by the growth of sales. We modified it by 
replacing sales by value added believing that it fits better to the Czech agricultural situation when some of 
the investment might rather aim at saving cost than at increasing sales, particularly if investment in our 
consideration includes also (often mainly) replacement of the consumed capital. .To test for the existence 
of financing constraints (due to imperfect credit market or agency costs), FAZZARI ET AL. (1988) proposed 
to introduce in the model a proxy for cash flow, whose coefficient, if it is significant, would indicate that 
investment depends on farm's own resources and thus would suggest a presence of the problem. Equation 
(2) relates the cash flow variable to technical efficiency, as the former is considered as both: the own 
resource for financing investment and a proxy for investment performance. Finally, the determinants of 
the firms’ technical efficiency are estimated in equation (3). In all three equations, ownership variables 
are  included,  as  they  are  expected  to  explain  investment  activity,  investment  return  and  technical 
performance (see Figure 1). In order to prevent potential endogeneity problems, yearly variables such as 
the change in value added, the cash flow and the technical efficiency, are introduced as lagged variables 
in the determinants. 
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 where 
Ki,t-1  represents  the  stock  of  capital  in  period  t-1;  it  includes  all  long-term  tangible  assets  (e.g. 
agricultural land, buildings, machinery and tools, etc.), intangible assets (licences-milk quotas, 
software, etc.) and financial assets (investments in equity in other firms, estate property for non-
business purposes). The normalisation by this variable eliminates size effects. 
Ii,t     is the value of gross investment between period t-1 and t, that is calculated as the change in capital 
stock (representing net investment) plus depreciation and amortization. 
DVA i,t-1 stands for the change in gross value added between period t-2 a t-1, and it is the proxy variable 
for investment opportunities. Gross value added is calculated as all revenues from farm and non-
farm  activities  including  changes  in  manufactured  products  inventory  minus  intermediate 
consumption (material inputs and services). 
CFi,t-1 represents the value of the farm’s cash flow that is available at the end of the period t-1 for 
purchasing  new  capital  stock  at  the  beginning  of  period  t.  It  substitutes  the  farm’s  income 
resources. The cash flow indicator is unavailable in the Czech double-entry accounting, therefore, 
it is calculated as retained earnings (profit or loss) plus depreciation and amortization. 
TEi,t-1 is the technical efficiency score of the i-th firm in the period t-1 (see appendix for the calculation 
details). 
CORPGOVi is a dummy variable (Corporate Governance) indicating corporate form of a farm. It is 
defined  in  two  ways.  Firstly,  corporate  governance  is  defined  by  more  than  10  owners  and, 
secondly, by other than limited liability legal form of the business, i.e. by JSCs and Cooperatives. 
Due to this, the above presented model will be estimated twice, using one or the other CORPGOV 
variable specification. 
REVENUESi represents the farm total revenue and is deemed to represent the size of a farm (in CZK). 
CAPCONCi is an average size of share in equity (fixed capital) per owner (in CZK). Higher values 
proxy higher concentration of capital. 
MANOWNi is a dummy variable indicating if managers own on average higher ownership shares that 
the  average  ownership  share  (1  for  management  members  own  higher  ownership  shares,  0 
otherwise). 
EXTOWNi is a share of external investors on the total number of owners. 
OWNNRi is a number of owners. 
crosstermsi,t-1 are products of 2 or 3 variables listed above (see Table 2 of econometric results for the 
exact specification). 
DIREDUCi is an ordinal variable of the education level of the top manager (1 represents advanced basic 
education without graduation examination, 2 high school education with graduation examination, 
3 university education). 
DIRAGEi is the age of the top manager. 
YEAR is a dummy variable for a specific year. 
, , 1 , 1 , , i t i t i t u n e - -  are error terms. 
Data on farm economic performance, investment and capital were taken from the official balance sheet, 
income statements and supplementary forms of the FADN CZ survey for years 1997-2003. Ownership 
structure  and  further  farm  characteristic  data  were  collected  in  the  Czech  Republic  in  2004.  This 
extensive data survey was organised by the Institute for Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern 
Europe (IAMO) and by the Research Institute for Agricultural Economics in Prague (VUZE). The sample 
for the analysis presented here includes 74 agricultural companies with a legal entity status (cooperatives, 
JSC and LLC). The firms in the sample can be mostly classified as farms with combined crop and animal 
production, but their crop/animal production proportions and size substantially varies.  
The unbalanced panel data technique was used for the estimation of the econometric model. No deflation 
of data was applied. The values of farms' technical performance (technical efficiency) were calculated 
using Data Envelopment Analysis (see Appendix 1). EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Following, parameters of the estimated structural model presented in Table 2 will be interpreted. Two 
almost identical models were estimated. They differ purely in the definition of the corporate governance 
variable (CORPGOV). In the first model, CORPGOV equal to one defines firms of another legal form 
than LLCs,
14 i.e. JSCs and Cooperatives; for LLCs, CORPGOV is equal to zero. In the second model, 
CORPGOV defines firms with more than 10 owners. First, we interpret Model 1. In the interpretation of 
Model 2, we will focus only on parameters which significantly differ from Model 1. 
Estimated parameters of Model 1 imply that investment activity is determined by the level of generated 
cash flow per capital (the level of generated internal funds, CFt-1/Kt-1), by the average capital share per 
shareholder  (capital  concentration,  CAPCONC),  managerial  ownership  (MANOWN),  the  ownership 
variables’  cross  terms  with  CFt-1/Kt-1  and  with  REVENUES  (the  proxy  for  firm’s  size  and  decision-
making complexity).  
Parameter  a3  indicates  that  corporate  ownership  structure,  CORPGOV,  decreases  farm  investment 
activity. This effect is significant at 10 % significance level. Assuming that management in a corporate 
setting  generally  tends  to  following  growth  and  diversification  strategies,  this  result  indicates  that 
dispersed ownership restricts management in its investment intentions, which implies that small owners 
are generally highly averse to investment risk or plan timely withdrawal of their share and are thus not 
interested in long-term farm performance development. This could relate to the fact that a high share of 
the corporate owners are former residual owners (owners long waiting for financial settlement of their 
transformation claims, retired persons, persons with little relationship to agriculture) and that corporate 
ownership is related to farm lower technical performance (parameter d1, significant at 1 % significance 
level). Owners’ aversion to investment risk and share withdrawal interest (negative effect of corporate 
ownership  on  investment  activity)  could  be  reduced  by  improved  farm  performance.  As  previously 
discussed  theories  suggest,  also  firm  size  and  decision-making  complexity  under  which  shareholders 
loose a degree of control over managers can decrease the investment effect of shareholders' risk aversion.  
Following this argument, REVENUES as proxy for size has a direct positive effect on investment activity 
in Model 2, where CORPGOV represents more than 10 owners, however, not in Model 1. In both models, 
size  has  a  positive  impact  on  farm  technical  performance  (d2)  and  a  negative  impact  on  financial 
performance (b2). This implies that indeed, revenues improving technical performance has a positive 
effect on investment activity; not necessarily financial performance of the farm. Purely within the group 
of  corporate  farms,  increasing  size  decreases  farm  technical  efficiency  (d6)  likely  due  to  the  high 
monitoring costs of workers performance, and improves financial performance (b6). This would indicate 
that  increasing  scope  for  managerial  discretion  (lesser  scope  for  owners'  control)  improves  financial 
performance of the farms; nevertheless, it does not increase investment activity. This corresponds with 
Chang and Wong’s (2003) findings that managers’ objectives can be better aligned with firm performance 
than those of principals. This interpretation implying that managerial discretion can have a positive effect 
on firms technical and financial performance is in contradiction to our hypothesis build on traditional 
principal agent theories. 
Furthermore, number of corporate owners (OWNNR), proxy for the complexity of decision making, does 
not significantly change the effect of corporate governance on investment activity. Nevertheless, this 
variable has a negative effect on technical performance (d7) as well as on financial management (b7). This 
would contradict the finding discussed in previous paragraph that more scope for managerial discretion 
improves financial performance in corporate farms, unless large number of shareholders does not provide 
as high a scope for positive managerial discretion as farm size does. This could be a relevant argument 
since managers have to be re-elected to retain their position in the future and farm managers are more 
reluctant to loosing their job than managers in other sectors.     
The estimates further reveal that the negative investment effect of corporate ownership is reduced by 
higher capital concentration. The higher corporate farm average capital share per owner the higher is the 
investment activity (a7). It implies that owners who are willing to invest more in the farm business are 
                                                 
14   In the analysed sample, LLCs have on average only 4 owners. Although LLCs are generally considered as one of the 
corporate legal forms, their governance structure is mostly very simple. Comparing the investment behaviour difference 
between LLCs and large-scale JSCs or cooperatives can provide interesting insight on the corporate governance investment 
effect.  less averse to investment risk and are more interested in the farm long-term performance than small 
owners which result corresponds with hypothesis 3. Corporate farms, where managers own higher shares 
than other shareholders on average, are, on the other hand, assigned by lower investment activity than 
other corporate farms (a8). In other words, managerial ownership has a negative effect on the level of 
investment  activity
15.  This  would  suggest  that  managers  owning  higher  ownership  shares  are  more 
conservative with regard to investment than where managers are less concerned with their ownership. In 
accordance with our hypothesis 3, this would imply that farming in a corporate form was considered by 
owners  as  highly  risky,  possibly  due  to  the  political  instability,  uncertainty  steaming  from  unclear 
property rights legal framework, or the EU accession. Managers, who were at the same time owners of 
higher ownership shares were more investment cautious than other managers. This would thus support 
existence of managerial discretion where there was a larger separation of ownership and control, and 
would, in connection with above findings, suggest that, despite of being more optimally behaving than 
small  non-controlling  owners,  managers  owning  small  shares  behave  less  optimally  with  regard  to 
investment than managers owning higher capital shares.  
Nevertheless, a deeper analysis of the MANOWN variable discloses that farms with higher managerial 
ownership are also characterised by significantly higher share of employees who are at the same time 
shareholders  (65%  compared  to  56%  in  other  companies;  using  the  analysis  of  variance  (ANOVA) 
significant  at  5%  significance  level).  This  closer  connection  of  employee  owners,  who  are  generally 
considered as more risk averse, to the business operation might have an effect on the decision making and 
behaviour of elected managers. Also, corporate farms with higher managerial ownership are led by older 
directors  (53  years  old  directors  compared  to  50.5  years  old  directors  in  other  companies;  ANOVA 
significant  at  1%  significance  level).  Also  this  characteristic  could  be  captured  in  the  effect  of  the 
MANOWN variable
16. The positive performance effect of managerial ownership is, however, confirmed 
also by the MANOWN variable effect on the farm technical performance (d4). 
The share of external versus employee ownership was found to have only  an insignificant  effect on 
investment activity. The share of external ownership has a positive statistically significant effect only on 
technical efficiency (d5). This finding contradicts our hypothesis that employee ownership aligns firm 
performance  with  employees’  interests  and  thus  improves  technical  performance  of  the  farm.  The 
direction of the parameter d5 would rather suggest the validity of HANSMANN’s (1996) argument that 
external ownership allows for achieving such a firm size which brings benefits from economies of scale. 
The positive performance effect of the share of employee ownership on firm performance was found in 
another variable, the variable OWNEMPL (share of owners in the total number of workers) (d8). This 
positive effect, however, diminishes with firm size (d9), possibly due to the increasing costs of collective 
decision-making (HANSMANN 1996). 
We previously intentionally skipped parameter a2, as the above results discussion makes its interpretation 
easier. This parameter indicates that investment activity of corporate farms including LLC companies 
have been constrained in their access to external financing or the farms have been more averse to external 
financing due to other business uncertainties. In both cases, corporate farms have relied to a high degree 
on internal funds than what theories suggest for perfect credit and other market conditions.  
Further  parameters  indicate  that  the  investment  sensitivity  to  internal  funds  varies  with  corporate 
governance modes. As parameter, a5, implies, investment sensitivity to generated internal funds is higher 
in  farms  with  corporate  governance  structure.  This  would  indicate  that  management  of  farms  with 
corporate ownership is limited in its investment decisions by the owners’ aversion to credit financing or 
managers them self want to avoid external control of their investment projects. Nevertheless, this effect 
was proven to be statistically insignificant. The investment sensitivity to internal funds, however, changes 
with concrete corporate governance characteristics.  Firstly,  increasing size of average ownership share  
                                                 
15   This effect, however, was not proven to be significant in Model 2, which defines corporate governance as more than 10 
owners. This suggests that farms with 10 and less owners are specific with respect to managerial ownership. Nonparametric 
Mann-Whitney test showed that in this group of farms, managerial ownership appears with significantly lower frequency 
than in farms with more than 10 owners. Only including the group of farms with 10 and less owners among the corporate 
farms shows the significance of this effect. 
16   Other characteristics related to the MANOWN variable, such as average ownership share, share of external ownership, 
number of owners are introduced into the model as separate variables and hence should not be captuder in the MANOWN 
variable. Dispite the ANOVA significance of the differences in the listed variables between farms with MANOWN = 1 and 
MANOWN = 0, the bivariate correlation between these variables are not higher than 0.3. Table 2  Estimation results from the system of equations 
    Model 1  Model 2 
    CORPGOV = Other than LLCs  CORPGOV = >10 owners 
Equation 1: I t/K t-1    Coeficient  Std. Error  Coeficient  Std. Error 
Constant  a0  0.162**  0.073  0.114*  0.044 
(VAt-1-VAt-2)/Kt-1  a1  -0.083  0.113  -0.063  0.075 
CF t-1/K t-1  a2  0.262**  0.119  0.301**  0.090 
CORPGOV  a3  -0.122*  0.073  -0.077*  0.044 
(VAt-1-VAt-2)/Kt-1* CORPGOV  a4  0.052  0.119  0.017  0.081 
(CF t-1/K t-1)* CORPGOV  a5  0.080  0.151  0.059  0.131 
REVENUES  a6  0.003  0.002  0.002*  0.001 
CAPCONC* CORPGOV  a7  0.019*  0.011  0.020*  0.011 
MANOWN* CORPGOV  a8  -0.042*  0.024  -0.036  0.024 
EXTOWN* CORPGOV  a9  -0.002  0.051  -0.011  0.053 
REVENUES* CORPGOV  a10  -0.003  0.002  -0.002  0.001 
OWNNR* CORPGOV  a11  0.002  0.005  0.002  0.005 
(CF t-1/K t-1)*CAPCONC* CORPGOV  a12  -0.002***  0.001  -0.002***  0.001 
(CF t-1/K t-1)*MANOWN* CORPGOV  a13  0.446***  0.170  0.414***  0.173 
(CF t-1/K t-1)*EXTOWN* CORPGOV  a14  0.035  0.352  0.304  0.389 
(CF t-1/K t-1)*REVENUES* CORPGOV  a15  0.002  0.004  0.001  0.004 
(CF t-1/K t-1)*OWNNR* CORPGOV  a16  0.009  0.038  0.002  0.038 
(CF t-1/K t-1)*REVENUES*CAPCONC* CORPGOV  a17  0.000  0.002  0.000  0.002 
(CF t-1/K t-1)*REVENUES*MANOWN* CORPGOV  a18  -0.004*  0.003  -0.004  0.003 
(CF t-1/K t-1)*REVENUES*EXTOWN* CORPGOV  a19  -0.009  0.007  -0.010  0.007 
YEAR0  a20  0.015  0.023  0.014  0.022 
YEAR1  a21  0.003  0.023  0.003  0.023 
YEAR2  a22  0.032  0.021  0.031  0.021 
YEAR3  a23  0.016  0.020  0.010  0.020 
Equation 2: CF t-1/K t-1           
Constant  b0  -0.046  0.085  0.083  0.091 
CORPGOV  b1  -0.044  0.049  -0.143***  0.049 
REVENUES  b2  -0.003*  0.002  0.001  0.002 
CAPCONC* CORPGOV  b3  -0.005  0.006  -0.005  0.007 
MANOWN* CORPGOV  b4  -0.014  0.013  -0.014  0.013 
EXTOWN* CORPGOV  b5  -0.010  0.026  -0.004  0.027 
REVENUES* CORPGOV  b6  0.004**  0.002  0.000  0.002 
OWNNR* CORPGOV  b7  -0.009***  0.003  -0.010***  0.003 
REVENUES*CAPCONC* CORPGOV  b8  0.000  0.000  -0.010  0.024 
REVENUES*MANOWN* CORPGOV  b9  0.034  0.048  0.038  0.050 
REVENUES*EXTOWN* CORPGOV  b10  -0.001  0.001  -0.002  0.001 
TE t-1  b11  0.216***  0.058  0.183***  0.063 
YEAR0  b12  0.011  0.016  0.011  0.017 
YEAR1  b13  0.076***  0.016  0.074***  0.017 
YEAR2  b14  0.028*  0.016  0.026  0.017 
YEAR3  b15  -0.024  0.016  -0.026  0.017 
Equation 3: TE t-1           
Constant  d0  1.147***  0.050  1.198***  0.046 
CORPGOV  d1  -0.317***  0.043  -0.324***  0.037 
REVENUES  d2  0.013***  0.001  0.013***  0.001 
CAPCONC* CORPGOV  d3  -0.004  0.006  -0.008  0.005 
MANOWN* CORPGOV  d4  0.037***  0.012  0.036***  0.011 
EXTOWN* CORPGOV  d5  0.061***  0.024  0.072***  0.023 
REVENUES* CORPGOV  d6  -0.011***  0.001  -0.012***  0.001 
OWNNR* CORPGOV  d7  -0.009***  0.003  -0.009***  0.003 
OWNEMPL* CORPGOV  d8  0.042***  0.017  0.034**  0.016 
REVENUES *OWNEMPL* CORPGOV  d9  -0.001**  0.001  -0.001*  0.000 
DIREDUC  d10  0.020**  0.010  0.005  0.010 
DIRAGE  d11  0.011  0.075  0.001  0.001 
YEAR0  d12  0.011  0.016  0.010  0.015 
YEAR1  d13  -0.038**  0.016  -0.039***  0.015 
YEAR2  d14  -0.018  0.016  -0.018  0.015 
YEAR3  d15  -0.020  0.016  -0.020  0.015 decreases investment sensitivity to internal funds (parameter a12). The higher flexibility of farms with 
higher ownership concentration in using credit financing and hence in realizing investment projects could 
relate to their better financial performance indicator discussed in the previous paragraph. This finding also 
supports  a  statement  that  owners  with  small  ownership  shares,  mostly  owners,  who  are  waiting  for 
financial settlement of their original transformation claims, are not only more risk averse in relation to 
investment  as  such  but  also  more  averse  to  credit  financing  of  such  an  investment.  This  finding 
corresponds with the theoretical hypothesis 3.  
Parameter a13 captures the investment effect of the cross term between CFt-1/Kt-1, corporate governance 
and  managerial  ownership.  The  parameter  sign  indicates  that  managerial  ownership  increases  farms 
investment sensitivity to internal funds. As above results suggested, managers with higher ownership 
shares react more sensitively to business uncertainties than other managers. This is thus likely reflected 
also in their use of credit financing of their investment projects. As parameter a18 indicates, this effect 
changes with increasing farm size which generates benefits from economies of scale and hence reduces 
the farm dependence on external conditions. 
5  CONCLUSIONS 
Farm  ownership  was  found  to  have  a  significant  impact  on  investment  activity  and  farm  economic 
performance.  The  data  provided  the  evidence  of  the  positive  effect  of  ownership  concentration  on 
investment  activity  and  farms’  economic  performance:  farms  with  high  ownership  shares  and  less 
dispersed ownership have a higher development potential than farms with less concentrated ownership. 
The  analysis  allowed  for  insights  in  the  effect  of  managerial  ownership,  thought  it  also  raised  new 
questions and a need for further studying this form of ownership. Furthermore, the authors could not 
confirm the theoretically expected effect of external/employee ownership on farm investment activity. 
However,  they  found  a  theoretically  consistent  effect  of  external/employee  ownership  on  technical 
performance from the available sample of Czech corporate farms. The provided discussion suggests that 
this is mostly due to the transition-specific nature and interests of small shareholders to agricultural assets 
and high uncertainties steaming from market as well as legal environment.  
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APPENDIX 1 CALCULATION OF TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY 
A firm’s technical efficiency captures its ability to use in the best way the existing technology, in terms of 
input and output quantities (i.e. regardless of their price). Technical efficiency scores are calculated with 
the non-parametric method Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) that constructs the efficient frontier with 
the best performing farm of the sample. Farm lying on the frontier are fully efficient and are attributed a 
score of 1. Farms enveloped by the frontier are inefficient, and the distance to the frontier gives their 
efficiency score that is between 0 and 1 (excluded), with lower scores indicating higher inefficiency. The 
difference between 1 and the efficiency score of a firm indicates the proportional reduction of all inputs it 
could  implement  without  having  to  reduce  its  output  (input-orientation  of  the  DEA  model),  or  the 
proportional increase of all outputs it could reach without having to use more inputs (output-orientation) 
(for more details on the method, see COELLI ET AL., 2005). 
A linear programming model is used to construct the efficient frontier and calculate the efficiency score 
of each farm. An output-oriented frame under constant returns to scale is chosen (this assumption enables 
to consider inefficiencies not only due to bad management practices but also to suboptimal size). Three 
outputs (crop output, livestock output, other output) and four inputs (land, labour, capital, intermediate 
consumption) are used in the model. 
COELLI, T., RAO, D., O’DONNELL, C., BATTESE, G. 2005. An Introduction to Efficiency and Productivity 
Analysis. Second Edition, Springer, New York. 
 